When Is a Brain Like the Planet?
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Study at a glance
- Area
- Other research
- Study type
- Review & meta-analysis
- Authors
- Glymour C
- Journal
- Philosophy of Science
- Year
- 2007
- Protocol
- theoretical essay (causal modeling)
Key findings
- Treats mental properties as aggregates of neural properties, identified locally rather than universally
- Argues aggregates can have causal relations that none of their constituents have
- Proposes dynamical Bayes nets of macroscopic aggregates as the model for mental causation
- Responds to philosophical arguments that mental properties cannot cause actions
A philosophy of science essay on whether mental states can be causes. The author compares the mind to macroscopic quantities in fields such as economics and climate science, where aggregate measures built from many microscopic states can still be causally linked over time, modeled as directed graphs with probability distributions (dynamical Bayes nets). He argues that such causal time series of aggregates are the right model for mental causation, so changing a mental-level variable can have definite effects even when the underlying neural microstates are not fixed.